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The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes against U.S.
Citizens within the United States
I. INTRODUCTION

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 drew heated criticism from both sides of the political
spectrum 1 because it hinted that the U.S. military could, if necessary,
detain a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil in accordance with the laws of
armed conflict instead of through the criminal justice system. 2 A
number of commentators and politicians assert that this would
violate the fundamental constitutional rights that Americans enjoy. 3
The idea that the United States could use military force according to
the laws of armed conflict within the United States, however,
appears to be consistent with American history, 4 the text of the
Constitution, 5 and Supreme Court precedent. 6 In a similar way, the
U.S. military's targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen
living in Yemen, in 2011 was highly controversial and raised
questions about whether the United States could lawfully use

1. See, e.g., NOAA, ACLU BLOc Rls. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/tag
/ndaa; Sunana Batra, NDAA Passage Perfect Way to Sully Bill of Rights Anniversary with a Black Eye,
FREEREPUBLJC.COM (Dec. 16, 2011 ), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/2827817
/posts.
2. S. 1867, !12th Cong. § 1032(a) (b)(J) (2011). The text of the bill merely states that
the requirement to detain al-Qacda members does not extend to U.S. citizens. The implication is
that military detention according to the law of armed conOict is an option that the President may
exercise according to his or her discretion.
3. See Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmakers Sound Off Against Federal Detention Bill, SALT LAKE
TR lB. (Feb. 27, 20 12). http://www.sltrib.com/sl trib/poli tics/53598367 -90/utah-federal-actbill.html.csp; Kurt Nimmo, Ron Paul Introduces Legislation to Strike NOAA's Unconstitutional Section
1021, INFOWARS.COM Qan. 18, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/ron-paul-introduces-legislationto-strike-ndaas-unconstitutional-section- l 021.
4. See, e.g., Warren W. Hassler, Jr., American Civil War, BRITTANICA.COM,
http://w ww.brirannica.com/EBchecked/topic/19407/American-Civil-War (noting that the U.S.
government used military force within the borders of the United States and against U.S.
citizens).
5. See U.S. CoNST. amend. Ill (foreseeing that the federal government may need to use
military force within the United States and proscribing how troops might be quartered in civilian
homes).
6. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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military force against its own citizens. 7 As one commentator
observed, however, "[n]o laws, international or domestic, prohibit
the practice if it is carried out by a state against an enemy of that
state actively engaged in an armed conflict against that state." 8
Despite the fact that the laws of armed conflict have applied to
the use of military force within the borders of the United States and
to U.S. citizens in the past, many Americans have argued that it is a
gross violation of their rights. 9 It raises the question: What other
aspects of military force would be permissible within the United
States and against its citizens under the laws of armed conflict that
run contrary to current popular assumptions? To explore this issue,
this Comment poses the intentionally provocative question: Could
the U.S. military conduct an armed drone strike against a U.S. citizen
within the United States? The answer is most likely yes, but only
under a narrow set of circumstances.
The use of unmanned armed aerial drones to target individuals
during armed conflict is one of the most controversial U.S. practices
in the War on Terror. 10 Recent years, however, have only seen an
increase in the number of armed drone attacks overseas, 11 and the
United States continues to defend its lawfulness. 12 If the use of
armed drone strikes is acceptable under the laws of armed conflict,
and the laws of armed conflict apply to the use of military force
within the United States, then the U.S. military could conceivably
target a U.S. citizen in the United States using an armed drone. The
following is a hypothetical scenario that will be referred to
throughout this Comment.
7. See Glenn Greenwald, The Due-Process-Free Assassination of US Citizens Is Now Reality,
SALON.COM (Sep. 30, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/30/awlaki_6/singleton.
8. Mike Dreyfuss, My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and
Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65 VAND. L. REV. 249, 291 (2012).
9. See Gehrke, supra note 3; Greenwald, supra note 7.
I 0. See Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks irt Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L REV. 77, 126 (2010);
Akbar Nasir Khan, Legality of Targeted Killings by Drone Attacks in Pakistan, PAK. lNST. PEACE STUD.
(20 11), available at http://www.san-pips.com/download. php?f= 76. pdf.
11. Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics
.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned _aerial_vehicl es/i ndex.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2012).
12. Kenneth Anderson, Harold Koh Statements on Drone Warfare at ASIL Tonight, VOLOKH
CoNSPIRACY (Mar. 25, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/03/25/harold-koh-state ments-on-dronewarfare-at-asil-tonight.
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A. Scenario for an Armed Drone Strike within the United States
Consider the following hypothetical:
The U.S. military has recently captured ai-Qaeda operatives in
Afghanistan who, when interrogated, provided consistent accounts
of a plan to remotely detonate chemical weapons in the Alamo and
at least two more unknown locations in or around San Antonio,
Texas. The attack is supposed to happen within the next few days,
but no one knows exactly when. Initial estimates place the civilian
death toll at about 1,000 people. According to the detainees, the aiQaeda members planning the attack live in a suburban
neighborhood just outside of San Antonio. Two ai-Qaeda members
along with their families live in the house, which acts as the
operations center for the attack. All are U.S. citizens. In preparation
for the attack, the ai-Qaeda members have stockpiled small arms,
ammunition, chemical weapons, and even some larger anti-tank
weapons as well as remote detonating equipment. Within hours,
law enforcement officials have identified the house in question and
have observed individuals coming and going consistent with the
human intelligence. Two persons have been identified as known aiQaeda operatives. Civilian law enforcement agents have made no
attempt to intercept or apprehend the persons out of fear that doing
so would prompt them to remotely trigger the chemical weapons,
which have yet to be located. Civilian law enforcement is also
unequipped to deal with chemical weapons and anti-tank weapons.
The President of the United States conducts a thorough review of
the evidence and determines that the ai-Qaeda members pose an
imminent threat of violence and that capture is not possible.
Invoking the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the
President orders a series of armed drone strikes on the house
designed to kill the targets before they have a chance to remotely
detonate the chemical weapons. Within hours the house has been
completely destroyed and everyone inside has been killed. Later, an
investigation finds that the strikes killed two known ai-Qaeda
operatives as well as seven family members and ten neighbors.

While admittedly disturbing, this scenario is likely legal under
current domestic laws and lawful under the laws of armed conflict.
This Comment deals primarily with lex lata, the law as it currently
stands and does not define what the law should be. In Part II, this
Comment examines why military force has been and continues to be
justified and regulated under the laws of armed conflict within the
territory of the United States. Part III deals with the lawfulness of
155

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

targeting U.S. citizens during armed conflict. Part IV ultimately
concludes that it is currently legal to use armed drones within the
United States to target U.S. citizens.
II. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT APPLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

A quick review of the history of American armed conflict reveals
a striking trend that may be influencing popular conceptions on the
use of military force within the United States. The last major armed
conflict against a foreign nation fought on U.S. soil was the War of
1812, in which the British sacked and burned the White House. 13
This was followed by the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, which was
the last time a major war occurred on U.S. soil. 14 Various wars
against American Indian tribes lasted until the late 1800s. 15 Since
then, all armed conflicts in which the United States has been
involved have occurred extraterritorially. 16 While two devastating
attacks-Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001-occurred within the territory of the United
States, the ensuing armed conflicts occurred on foreign soil. 17 The
result is the creation of an American tradition that armed conflict is
something that happens overseas, not at home. The applicability of
the laws of armed conflict within the United States, however, has
not changed. Absent this century-old tradition of exclusively
extraterritorial armed conflict,
it might be completely
uncontroversial for the government to use military force against
enemy combatants within its own borders. For Americans today,
however, this raises legitimate concerns about the balance between
national security and constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is

13. David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. Heidler, War of 1812, BRITANNICA.COM,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/181068/War-of-1812 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
14. Hassler, supra note 4.
15. See ELLIOT WEST, THE LAST INDIAN WAR: THE NEZ PERCE STORY XV (2009) (arguing
that the last major American Indian war was against the Nez Perce and ended in 1877).
16. See American History Timeline: American Involvement in Wars from Colonial Times to the
AMERICANHISTOR Y.ABOUT. COM, http:/I americanhi story. abou t.com/li brary/timelines/
bltimelineuswars.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).

Present,

17. See Pearl Harbor Attack, BRIT ANNICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/Ebchecked
/topic/448010/Pearl-Harbor-attack (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); Peter L. Bergen, September 11
Attacks, BRITANNICA.C:OM, http://www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/762320/Scptcmber-11attacks (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
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therefore worthwhile to review how the law of armed conflict applies
under certain circumstances within the United States.
The text of the Constitution, American history, and Supreme
Court precedent all indicate that, if necessary, the United States
could fight an armed conflict on U.S. soil and even against U.S.
citizens in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. This applies
to the current Global War on Terror as authorized by Congress in
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) .18
A. Historical View of the Law of Armed Conflict in the United States

A review of the text of the Constitution shows that armed
conflict within the United States was one of the major subjects that
concerned the Framers. One of the stated purposes in the preamble
of the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense." 19 Article
I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war, raise an army,
maintain a navy, and define and punish violations of the law of
nations. 20 Article II, Section 2 sets up the executive as the
commander and chief of the army and navy. 21 While not often
recognized as a "war power," Article III, Section 3 gives the Judiciary
power to try U.S. citizens who are "levying War" against the United
States for treason. 22 It also ~ives power to Congress to determine the
punishment for treason. 3 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights
contemplated the use of military force and the application of the
laws of armed conflict within the United States. The Third
Amendment specifically allows troops to be quartered in private
homes in times of war in a manner prescribed by law. 24 While the
case of al-Aulaqi, in which a U.S. citizen adheres to an enemy group
like al-Qaeda, is relatively surprising and rare in modern times, 25 in
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001).
19. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
20. !d. at an. I, § 8, cis. 11-13.
21. !d. at art. II, § 2.
22. I d. at art. Ill, § 3.
23. Id.
24. /d. at amend. III.
25. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1945) (discussing the rarity of U.S.
citizens taking up arms against their country). But see Abu Mansur AI Amriki, U.S. jihadi in
Somalia, Reportedly Claims Comrades Want to Kill Him, HUFF!NGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 17, 2012),
http://www.huflingtonposl.com/20 12/03/17/abu-mansur-al-amriki-video_n _1355387.html
(showing that ai-Aulaqi is not unique in being a U.S. citizen who has joined a terrorist group).
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1789 the Framers were keenly aware of the possibility that U.S.
citizens mi~ht engage in armed conflict with the federal
government. 6 Dealing with a treason case in 1945, the Supreme
Court observed the following about the Framers:
When our forefathers took up the task of forming an independent
political organization for New World society, no one of them
appears to have doubted that to bring into being a new government
would originate a new allegiance for its citizens and inhabitants.
Nor were they reluctant to punish as treason any genuine breach of
allegiance, as every government time out of mind had done. The
betrayal of Washington by Arnold was fresh in mind. They were far
more awake to powerful enemies with designs on this continent
than some of the intervening generations have been .27

A little less than four-score years later, the Civil War provided
perhaps the most devastating example of the federal government's
use of military force against U.S. citizens within U.S. territory. The
Union Army killed about 75,000 U.S. citizens who were fighting for
the Confederacy during that armed conflict. 28 In Ex Parte Milligan, a
military detention case arising after the Civil War, both sides to the
controversy recognized that the laws of armed conflict as applied
during the Civil War were "accepted as part of the law of nations,
and extended . . . to all belligerents." 29
Even after the Civil War, when the U.S. transitioned into the
current era of exclusively extraterritorial armed conflict, military
force and military tribunals were used against U.S. citizens. During
the Second World War, for example, a number of U.S. citizens chose
to fight for Nazi Germany against the Allies and the United States. 30

26. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 8.
27. Td.
28. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 849 Qohn W. Chambers Il
ed., Oxford University Press 1999).
29. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 36 (1866). The Court in Milligan eventually found that
military tribunals after a conflict were not acceptable for U.S. citizens when federal courts were
operational in that same jurisdiction. Td. at 127. While this has implications for the NOAA of
2012, it does not touch the question of whether the U.S. government could use an armed drone
strike against a U.S. citizen within the United States.
30. Shaun Downey, Americans in the SS, PooR MOUTH BLOG Qune 10, 2006),
http://thepoormouth.blogspot.com/2006/06/americans-in-ss.html; Gary Warth, Columnist
Recounts Tale of German-Americans Fighting for Nazis, ]OURNALSTAR.COM Quly 8, 2006, 7:00 PM)
http://journalstar.com/lifestyles/article _66492ff6-2d6c-5bf0-a 1a4-499 7e5b9d5 78 .html.
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On the battlefields in Europe, the U.S. military treated these U.S.
citizens according to the laws of armed conflict and not according to
U.S. criminal law. 31 While no battles during the Second World War
were fought on U.S. soil, the same rules applied to U.S. citizens who
took up arms against the United States. 32
The case of Herbert Hans Haupt is illustrative of this point.
Haupt was a U.S. citizen who had lived in the United States since he
was five years old, but left to fight for Germany during the Second
World War. 33 Along with a handful of fluent English speakers in the
German military, he clandestinely returned to the United States via
submarine to sabotage U.S. military operations and to engage in
what might now be referred to as terrorism. 34 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation arrested Haupt and his fellow would-be saboteurs and
turned them over to a military tribunal to be tried according to the
laws of armed conflict, not U.S. domestic criminal law. 35 The
military tribunal found Haupt guilty of violating the laws of war. 36 In
Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court affirmed the military tribunal's
jurisdiction. 37 It further held that the laws of armed conflict
governed the way the U.S. military deals with an enemy belligerent
regardless of his status as a U.S. citizen. 38 "Citizens who associate
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and
with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on
3 I. See Oregonian Editorial Bd., Sixty-five Years After Operation Overlord, OREGONL!VE.COM
Qune
5,
2009),
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2009/06/sixtyfive_years_
after_operatio.html. Don Malarkey, a World War Two veteran, made famous in the book and
television series Band of Brothers, recounts meeting a German prisoner of war who was
originally from Portland, Oregon. The prisoner was treated the same way as the other prisoners
of war.
32. See infra note 38.
33. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942), modified, U.S.exrel. Quirin v. Cox, 63 S. Ct. 22
(I 942).
34. See id. at 21.
35. Id. at 21, 23.
36. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 206-07 (2d ed. 2004).
37. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
38. Id. at 37. President Roosevelt's decision to try Haupt in a military tribunal was
controversial, and subsequent cases arising out of the same facts resulted in Art. III § 3 treason
trials in civilian courts. FISHER, supra note 36, at 205-08; see also Cramer v. United States, 325
U.S. 1 (1945). However, the fact that President Roosevelt decided to change the way he
prosecuted an armed conflict only shows that a president may exercise discretion in applying the
laws of armed conflict instead of criminal law. The Supreme Court precedent in Quirin and
Cramer show that either is acceptable as a matter of law.
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hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the
law ofwar." 39 Haupt was executed on August 8, 1942. 40
B. The Laws of Armed Conflict Applied During the War on Terror
The question of how the laws of armed conflict apply to U.S.
citizens during times of war has arisen most recently during the
Global War on Terror. 41 With congressional authorization, the
President may use military force against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil
when that person is taking active part in an armed conflict against
the United States. This would apply generally to anyone actively
participating in the Global War on Terror.
Before discussing how the laws of armed conflict apply in these
instances, however, it is necessary to discuss whether the United
States is currently in a state of armed conflict or war. 42 Following the
attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), allowing the President to use
all necessary means against those responsible for the attacks. 43
While there is no statutory formula for declaring that the United
States is in a state of war, declarations of war have traditionally
consisted of two parts: first, an official declaration that a state of war
exists between two states; and second, an authorization for the
President to use all necessary military force. 44
39. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 3 7, 38.
40. 8 August 1942 - Herbert Hans Haupt, EXECUTION DAY, http://eotd. word press. com
/2008/08/08/8-august-1942-herbert-hans-haupt/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
41. See supra notes 1-3.
42. See Gabor Rona, U.S. Targeted Killing Policy Unjustified, jURIST.ORG (Feb. 24, 2012),
http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/gabor-rona-targeted-killing.php (arguing that the War on
Terror is substantively different than an international armed conflict like the Second World
War).
43. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
44. See An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
Dependencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their Territories, AVALON PROJECT YALE L.
ScH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th _ century/1812-0l.asp (last visited on Nov. 19, 2012)
(declaration for the War of 1812); President McKinley and the Declaration of War, SPANISH AMERICAN
WAR CENTENNIAL WEBSITE, http://www.spanamwar.com/ McKinleywardec.htm (last visited
Nov. 19, 2012) (declaration for the Spanish American War); Text of the Declaration of War Against
Germany World War I, NATIONALCENTER.ORG, http://www.nationalcentcr.org/DeclarationofWWI.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 20 12) (declaration for World War I); Declarations of a State of War with japan,
Germany,
and
Italy:
Part
10,
AVALON
PROJECT
YALE
L.
SCH.,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/declO.asp (declaration for the Second World War) (last visited
Nov. 19, 2012).
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The AUMF is similar to a declaration of war in that it authorizes
the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 45

The AUMF also specifically invokes congressional war powers. 46
The AUMF, however, is unlike past declarations of war in that it
fails to explicitly describe a state of war. The magic words
"declaration of war" are probably no longer necessary or appropriate,
however, since a new regime of international law was ushered in
after the Second World WarY The United Nations Charter generally
outlawed war and triggered the demise of the word "war" as a "legal
term of art." 48
Accordingly, the War Powers Resolution specifically allows the
executive to invoke war powers without an overt declaration of war
as long as there is specific statutory authorization from Congress. 49
Furthermore, the U.S. Army maintains that a formal declaration of
war is not essential to trigger the laws of armed conflict. 50 The
Korean War, for instance, was an international armed conflict
authorized by the U.N. Security Council 51 without a declaration of
war. 52 President Harry Truman agreed that the Korean War was a
"police action under the United Nations." 53 According to Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, states also have an inherent right to use force in

45. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
46. Jd.
47. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 7-8 (2nd ed.
2009).
48. Jd.
49. so

u.s.c. § 1541

(2012).

50. Department of the Army Field Manual27-10, ch. 1, § 1 (1956).
51. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 Qune 27, 1950).
52. Allan R. Millett, Korean War, BRITANNICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com
/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-War (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
53. The President's News Conference of june 29, 1950, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,
http://Leachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=594 (last visited Sept. 27,
2012).
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self-defense when they have been the object of an armed attack. 54
Under the new paradigm, it is no longer necessary or even
appropriate to declare war when all that is required is to invoke the
right of self-defense or U.N. Security Council authorization. The
AUMF explicitly invoked the right of self-defense, 55 and the U.N.
Security Council recognized the ri~ht of self-defense immediately
following the September 11 attacks. 6
The fact that the AUMF legally triggered the laws of armed
conflict is reinforced by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions
applies to the Global War on Terror. 57 Common Article Three deals
solely with armed conflicts. 58 Taking all this into consideration, the
AUMF, while not without serious flaws, is a sufficient declaration of
war or armed conflict to trigger the laws of armed conflict.
For the most part, the laws of armed conflict have applied today
in the same way they did during the Second World War. While the
War on Terror raises tough questions in international law, 59 the
Supreme Court has made it clear from a domestic perspective that
the War on Terror is an armed conflict governed by Common Article
Three of the Geneva Conventions. 60 According to its text, Common
Article Three applies to "armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties . . . . " 61 The hypothetical scenario Comment outlined in
Section II of this Comment occurs within the territory of the United
States, which is a high contracting party to the Geneva
Conventions. 62 Viewed in its proper context, Common Article Three
54. U.N. Charter art. 51.
55. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
56. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
57. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006).
58. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
59. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Er.hancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War
on Terror?, 43 COLUM. ]. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2005) (describing the difficulties of claiming selfdefense against a non-state actor like Al-Qaeda).
60. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629.
61. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
62. See ICRC, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related
Treaties, lNT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/
IHL.nsf/%28SPFo/o29/party_main_ treaties/$File/IHL_ and_other_related_Treaties. pdf.
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consists of two parts-one explicit and one implicit. The explicit part
of Common Article Three describes a minimum amount of
protections that must be afforded to "[p] ersons taking no active part
in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid
down their arms and those placed hors de combat . . . . "63 The
implicit part of Common Article Three is that persons who are
actively taking part in hostilities and are not hors de combat can be
targeted and killed according to the customary laws of armed
conflict. This clear authority to target U.S. citizens who are taking
active part in hostilities against the United States must be balanced,
however, with constitutional guarantees that proscribe what actions
the government can take against an individual. 64
The Supreme Court struggled to strike that balance in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld in 2004. 65 Most of the analysis in Hamdi deals with the
question of detention, which, inter alia, does not affect the legality of
the scenario presented in this Comment. 66 The plurality in Hamdi
did, however, reaffirm the general principle in Ex parte Quirin that a
person may be considered an enemy combatant according to the laws
of armed conflict regardless of citizenship, holding: "There is no bar
to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant. " 67
Based on the Constitution, U.S. history, and Supreme Court
precedent, it is clear that the President, when authorized by
Congress, may use military force against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil
when that person is taking active part in an armed conflict against
the United States. Such a use of force is governed by the laws of
armed conflict and not by domestic criminal law. Furthermore, the
AUMF has triggered the laws of armed conflict and is an adequate
grant of power to the executive branch to prosecute a war against
terror anywhere in the world, including the United States. This

63. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 61, at
136.
64. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Td. at 519.
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authorization, however, is not unlimited. 68 Several checks exist on
the use of military force within the United States.
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE WITHIN THE U.S. AND
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS

The major restrictions on the use of military force within the
United States and against U.S. citizens are due process rights, the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Executive
Order 12333, and the Posse Comitatus Act.
The plurality in Hamdi dealt primarily with the issue of due
process rights as contained in the Fifth Amendment. 69 It held that
even though U.S. citizens may lawfully be classified as enemy
combatants, they are due some form of process before they are
deprived of life or liberty?0 "[W] ar is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." 71 It
is only logical that if due process limitations apply to detention
during armed conflict then similar limitations would also apply to
targeting during armed conflict. 72 The Hamdi plurality used the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires the private
interest of the individual be weighed against the government's
interest to determine if the risk of potential error stemming from
reduced process outweighs the overall benefits to the government. 73
Applied to the facts in Hamdi, the plurality found that Hamdi
could not be accorded the full array of due process rights that a
defendant in a criminal trial might receive, but the Constitution
requires that he at least be able to challenge his status as an enemy

68. Jeh Charles johnson, Gen. Counsel Dept. of Def., Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School:
National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/20 12/02/jeh-johnson -speech-at -yale-law-school.
69. See I-Iamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Id. at 536.
72. It is important to note, however, that in his dissent in Hamdi, justice Souter argues
that the AUMF does not allow for detention, but that it does allow for the use of military force
against individuals. The AUMF "is fairly read to authorize the use of armies and weapons,
whether against other armies or individual terrorists." !d. at 547 (Souter,]., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). If this is followed, targeting would actually
be less scrutinized than detention.
73. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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combatant. 74 Specifically, Hamdi "must receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker." 75
The executive and legislative branches, therefore, are restricted to
some degree by the individual due process rights of accused enemy
combatants, although it is not clear in the scenario in this Comment
exactly what those would look like.
Next, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is a human rights treaty that could theoretically limit the
U.S. government's use of military force against its own citizens. 76
Among other things, the ICCPR requires that all signatories respect
the human rights and freedoms of their citizens by not arbitrarily
depriving them of life. 77 Furthermore, a state may take the life of
one of its citizens only "pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court." 78 In many ways, the ICCPR overlaps with the due
process rights contained in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, but the language of the treaty is much more explicit.
So while the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi that some form of process
was required by the Constitution, 79 the ICCPR requires specific forms
of process when dealing with the deprivation of life. 80
While derogation from some parts of the ICCPR is allowed
during "time[s] of public emergency [that threaten] the life of the
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed," Article
Six, which deals with the right to life, is non-derogable. 81 Based
solely on the text of the ICCPR, it would seem that a competent
court would have to find a person guilty before the U.S. government

74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
75. Id.
76. See Thomas Nachbar, Is it Legal?: Can the U.S. Legally Kill Citizens Abroad?, VA. L. REV.
(Mar.
6,
2012),
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2012 _spr/targeted_killing.htm
(wondering if the ICCPR applies or whether the laws of armed conflict apply to the al-Awlaqi
targeted killing).
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T.
521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
78. Id.
79. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T.
521,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
81. Id. at art. 4.
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could target them. In times of armed conflict, however, the ICCPR
may often be "superseded by the laws of war." 82
In the end, the possibility that the ICCPR could limit the use of
military force against U.S. citizens is mostly academic. The Supreme
Court has held that "although the [ICCPR] does bind the United
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the
Covenant on the express understanding that it was not selfexecuting and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts." 83 In the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Congress did enact some parts of the ICCPR prohibiting extrajudicial
killings, but only as a civil liability after a killing has occurred and
only against a foreign state official. 84 In addition, the U.S. is not a
party to the International Criminal Court, which is the only currently
constituted international court that could conceivably hear a
controversy between a U.S. citizen and the U.S. government. 85
Therefore, until Congress implements legislation for the specific
provisions contained in Article Six, or until the United States
becomes a party to the International Criminal Court, the ICCPR
creates no binding legal restriction on the President in a scenario like
the one proposed in this Comment.
Some have wondered if Executive Order 12333, which prohibits
assassination, should act as an effective bar against targeting an
individual combatant. 86 The order states simply, "No person
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination." 87 The U.S.
Army, however, defines assassination generally as a covert murder

82. Q&A: US Targeted Killings and International Law, HUM. Rrs. WATCH (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www .hrw.org/news/20 11/12/19I g-us-targeted-killings-and- international-law.
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004).
84. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
85. Curtis A. Bradley, ASIL Insights: U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal
Court Treaty, AM. Soc'y INT'L L. (May 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh 87.cfm#_ednl. It might
be possible, however, for a third-party state to espouse the cause of a U.S. citizen wbose rights
under the ICCPR were violated and bring a case against the United States before the
International Court of Justice, especially if that citizen had dual citizenship with the third-party
state. It also might be possible to set up an ad hoc tribunal to try the U.S. government for a
violation of the ICCPR. These scenarios, however, are highly improbable.
86. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2011, at Al, available at http:!/www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-usmemo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html? _r= l.
87. United States Intelligence Activities, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59952 (Dec. 8, 1981).
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for political reasons, and not as a targeted killing during a time of
armed conflict or when an individual poses an immediate threat to
the United States. 88 The executive branch, of course, is free to reinterpret or to rescind an executive order in the course of
administering the U5. government. 89 Therefore, Executive Order
12333 does not bar the targeted killings of U.S. citizens within the
United States or elsewhere.
The final major limitation on the ability of the U.S. Government
to use military force within the United States and against U.S.
citizens is the Posse Comitatus Act, which was enacted after the
Civil War to keep local civilian law enforcement from using military
personnel and equipment. 90 It stands for the principle that the
militar~ should never be used to enforce civil laws in the United
States. 1 Some courts have looked to see whether the military has
assumed the role of civilian law enforcement in the way it arrests or
detains individuals. 92 This, however, is not a concern in the
hypothetical scenario since using military force is, by definition, not
the role of civilian law enforcement within the United States.
Furthermore, the text of the act seems to render it completely
inapplicable to the War on Terror. It reads:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 93

The AUMF is an act of Congress that authorizes the president to
use military force without any restriction on geography. 94 The Posse
Comitatus Act, therefore, would not bar the government from using
military force within the borders of the United States. Because

88. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY L.,
Dec. 1989, at 4.
89. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, ]R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 7:31 (3d ed.
2010).
90. Tom A. Gizzo & TamaS. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Use of
the Military in the Struggle Against International Terrorism, IS PACE INT'L L. REV. 149, 153-55 (2003).
91. ld.
92. Id. at 166-67.
93.

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).

94. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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neither the Posse Comitatus Act nor due process are total bars to the
use of military force within the United States, and because the
relevant portions of the ICCPR have yet to be executed in U.S. law, it
is currently legal for the U.S. government to use military force within
the United States. It is also probably legal to target U.S. citizens.
IV. TARGETED KILLINGS OF U.S. CITIZENS
It is unlikely that Anwar al-Aulaqi was surprised when the group
he was traveling with in Yemen spotted a CIA-operated drone
carrying a hellfire missile on September 30, 2011. 95 Al-Aulaqi, a U.S.
citizen who was actively involved with an al-Qaeda affiliate in
Yemen, had already escaped one U.S. drone attack earlier that year. 96
By the time the strike occurred, he had been a publicly known target
of the U.S. military for over a year and a half. 97 His father had even
attempted to intervene on his behalf through the U.S. court system,
but was denied standing. 98 The hellfire missile deployed from the
drone killed al-Aulaqi, another U.S. citizen who was traveling with
him, and at least five other people. 99 Two weeks later, another U.S.
drone strike targeted and killed al-Aulaqi's sixteen-year-old son,
Abdulrhaman. 100 The series of armed drone strikes on al-Aulaqi and
his family appears to be the first time that the United States has
deliberately targeted and killed U.S. citizens in the War on Terror. 101

95. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/times
topics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated july 18, 2012);
Dominic Rushe et a!., Anwar al-Awlaki Death: US Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen Fallout,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
30,
2011,
14:31
EDT),
http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/
2011/sep/30/an war -al-awlaki -yemen ?news feed= true.
96. David S. Cloud, U.S.-born Cleric was Target of Yemen Drone Strike, L.A. TiMES (May 7,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/07/world/la-fg-yemen-drones-20110507.
97. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the
Washington Post had reported in january 2010 that al-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list").
98. !d. at 1.
99. Rushe, supra note 95.
100. Glenn Greenwald, The Killing of Awlaki's 16-Year-Old Son, SALON.COM (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/20 11/1 0/20/the _killing_of_awlakis _16 _year_old _son/single ton.
101. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/a/an war_a!_ awlaki/index.html ?in line= nyt -per.
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Initially, the reaction in the U.S. was highly critical. 102 President
Obama's targeted killing of al-Aulaqi, however, found some support
in unlikely places. Former Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, a
Democrat known as. a champion of civil liberties, said that he was
"very pleased that [al-Aulaqi] was taken out." 103 Even Obama's onetime campaign rival, Senator John McCain praised the operation. 104
Since then, the Obama administration has tentatively attempted to
publicly justify the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. An anonymous
leaker gave parts of a memo from the Office of Legal Counsel that
provided the legal justifications for targeting U.S. citizens to the
New York Times in October 2011. 105 Then, in February, 2012, Jeh
Johnson, general counsel for the Department of Defense, explained
the policy during a speech at Yale University. 106 Johnson emphasized
that the AUMF had no "geographical limitation" and defended
targeted killings by pointing out that the U.S. lawfully targeted
individuals during the Second World War as wel1. 107
The most detail on the justification for targeting U.S. citizens
came in March 2012 when Attorney General Eric Holder publicly
addressed the issue at Northwestern University School of Law. 108
Like Johnson, he emphasized that the current war is not limited
geographically to Afghanistan or any other state. 109 He then
described three elements necessary for a targeted killing of a U.S.

102. See, e.g., GreC'nwald, supra note 7; Paul Craig Roberts, The Day America Died,
LEWROCKWI:LL.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts328.html; Michael
Martinez, US. Drone Killing of American al-Awlaki Prompts Legal, Moral Debate, CNN (Sept. 30,
2011 ),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-30/politics/politics _targeting-us-citizens_l_al-awlakiyemeni-embassy-drone-missile? _s=PM:POLITICS.
103. Andrea Stone, Russ Feingold 'Pleased' Anwar Al-1\.wlaki Was Taken Out By Drone Strike,
HUHJNG1 ON POST (Feb. 22, 201 2), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 12/02/22/russ-feingoldanwar-al-awlaki_ n_1291593.html?ref=politics.
I 04. Sara Sorcher, McCuin: Obama Does Not Need to Apologize for Awlaki Killing, NAT'L). (Oct.
3, 201 I), http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/mccain-obama-does-not-need-toapologize-for-awlaki-killing-201 11003.
I 05. Savage, supra note 86.
106. johnson, supra note 68.
107. Id.
108. josh Gerstein, Eric Holder: Targeted Killings Legal, Constitutional, POLITICO (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73634.html.
109. Greg McNeal, Attorney General Eric Holder's National Security Speech, FORBES
(Mar. 5, 20 12), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/20 12/03/05/holder-national
-security-speech-targeted-killing/4.
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citizen in a foreign nation to be lawful: "First, the U.S. government
has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the
individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the
United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the
operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with
applicable law of war principles."llo
According to Holder, this would be enough to satisfy the
necessary balance between the government's interest in prosecuting
the War on Terror and an individual U.S. citizen's due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment. 111 While it is possible that the
Supreme Court could review Holder's formulation, the Court would
most likely grant the executive branch significant deference. 112
Furthermore, as Al-Aulaqi v. Obama shows, it is difficult to find a
suitable plaintiff to challenge the executive's interpretation of the
law on this subject. 113 It is therefore unlikely that a future president
will face judicial review of his targeting policies, even if they are
more aggressive than the policy described by Holder.
The administration has been silent as to the targeting of U.S.
citizens within the United States. 114 However, a review of Holder's
three points shows that they contain no bar against application
within the United States. In interpreting Holder's statements, it is
important to bear in mind the context. Since the Obama
administration apparently used Holder's three elements in targeting
Anwar al-Aulaqi and his son, then the facts of those targeted killings
should give insight into how this targeting framework applies in the
real world. 115 For the purposes of this analysis, Holder's three points
are broken down into four elements: (1) thorough and careful
review, (2) imminent violence, (3) capture is not feasible, and (4) in
accordance with the law of armed conflict.

110. !d.
111. Id.

112. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2003).
113. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2010) (pointing out that
determining whether a person evading U.S. law enforcement can assert his own rights in federal
court is problematic).
114. Catherine Herridge, FBI director: Have to Check Whether Targeted Killing Rule is Outside US
Only, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/07 /muellerhave-to-check-with-holder-whether-targeted-killing-rule-is-outside-us.
115. See Savage, supra note 86.
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A. Thorough and Careful Review

The first element for targeting a U.S. citizen has two main parts.
The government must conduct a "thorough and careful review," and
that review must conclude that the targeted person poses an
"imminent threat of violent attack against the United States." 116 The
review process is apparently where the Obama administration is
attempting to satisfy the requirements of due process. The vague
nature of Holder's statement, however, raises questions about notice
and independent judicial review. Al-Aulaqi had effective notice of his
status as a targeted enemy combatant, but he did not have official
notice. 117 Giving notice to a target would cause the U.S. military to
lose a strategic advantage, but it may also encourage targeted
individuals to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda. These
considerations, however, are not legal, but strategic and tactical and
probably reside within an executive's discretion as Commander-inChief.118 However, the Supreme Court in Hamdi found that for
detention, a person must at least "receive notice of the factual basis
for his classification." ng This assumes, however, that the
government already has custody of an enemy combatant. 120
Targeting assumes the opposite: that it is not feasible to detain the
enemy combatant. 121
Using the balancing test in Matthews, 122 failure to give notice to a
potential target increases the chances of error, but may be
outweighed by the government's interest in an effective and
workable strategy during armed conflict. One significant error that
could be greatly reduced with notice is mistaken identity. This has
been a problem in the prosecution of the War on Terror, most
notably with Khaled al-Masri, a German citizen who claims to have
been captured and held by the United States because he supposedly

!16. McNeal, supra note 109.
117. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (noting that the Washington Post had reported in
january 2010 that ai-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list").
118. See johnson, supra note 68 (referring to these things as "core functions of the
Executive Branch").
119. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2003).
120. See id. (Hamdi was seeking post-detention habeas corpus relief).
121. See McNeal, supra note 109.
122. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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had the same name as a targeted terrorist. 123 In the scenario
described in this Comment, however, giving notice would be
completely unworkable since it would give the targeted persons time
to remotely detonate the chemical weapons. Therefore, while notice
might be preferable under certain circumstances, it is probably not
legally required.
The next question of the review process is whether the
executive's decision to target would be subject to an independent
review by the judiciary. Again in Hamdi the Supreme Court ruled that
detention of an enemy combatant required review by a "neutral
decision maker.'d 24 If this is the minimum amount of process
required for a detainee, it seems that it would also be a minimum
requirement for a targeted person. The Obama administration,
however, has rejected any judicial review of targeting decisions as
"not appropriate.'' 125
]eh Johnson, during his speech at Yale, argued that the "realtime" nature of the decisions would make judicial review
unworkable 126 and made reference to the Al-Aulaqi case in which the
federal district court ruled that courts could not possibly weigh these
kinds of strategic decisions. 127 For years, however, special courts
have been involved in national security decisions. 128 FISA courts, for
instance, gram or deny warrants requested by the executive branch
based on an ex parte showing that the target of the warrant is an
agent of a foreign power and that the purpose of the surveillance is
predominantly for foreign intelligence. 129 The judicial review process
of FISA courts is generally secret in order to more appropriately deal
with sensitive national security issues. 130 Using the Matthews
balancing test, judicial review could significantly limit error in
targeting decisions and would not appear to unduly burden the

123. US Rejects German's Case Against CIA,
SPIEGEL.DE
(May
19, 2006),
http://www.spiegel.de/internationai/O, 1518,417071,00.html.
124. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
125. johnson, supra note 68.
126. Id.
127. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 47 (2010).
128. See Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA,
CIPA, and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS]. 203, 219 (2006).
129. Id. at 219-20.
130. Id. at 221.
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executive in its decisions, especially since it is already going through
a careful review. However, while some form of judicial review does
seem to be workable and even preferable, it is clear that the
executive branch currently rejects this approachY 1 The AUMF
specifically allows for the targeting of persons according to
congressional and presidential war powers without any requirements
for judicial review. 132 Unless an independent review is statutorily
required by Congress, the current state of the law is that the
executive's decisions to target a person, even a U.S. citizen, will go
unquestioned externally.
B. Imminent Violence

Next, according to Holder, at the end of the thorough review, the
government must conclude that the proposed targeted person poses
an imminent threat of violence to the United States. 133 The concept
of imminence is apparently quite broad here if it is supposed to apply
to al-Aulaqi and his sixteen-year-old son. Al-Aulaqi had been
targeted for over a year, showing that the Obama administration
seems to interpret imminence as having a broad time frame. 134
Furthermore, it is hard to comprehend how a sixteen-year-old boy in
Yemen, like Abdurrahman al-Aulaqi, could pose an imminent threat
of violence to the United States, and yet he was targeted and killed
just like his father. 135 Such a result raises serious questions about
just how thorough and careful the review process is. One possible
explanation for the targeted killing of Abdulrahman is that the threat
of imminent violence that he posed was assessed in relation to the
ability to capture him, which is the next element.

131. johnson, supra note 68.
132. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
133. McNeal, supra note 109.
134. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, II (2010) (noting that the Washington
Post had reported in january 2010 that al-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list").
135. Greenwald, supra note 100. The killing of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi is particularly
disturbing in light of Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. It declares the punishment
for levying war against the United States is treason, but forbids a finding of treason to work
"corruption of blood'' U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3. In other words, the government is forbidden to
punish the children of traitors for the treasonous acts of their parents.
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C. Capture is Not Feasible

When Holder says that "capture is not feasible," 136 he probably
does not mean that capture is not possible, but only that capture is
not a good option based on a risk-benefit analysis. It would be hard
to argue that the U.S. military could not actually capture al-Aulaqi,
even in Yemen. It was possible, but it was perhaps too difficult and
dangerous. This makes more sense when one considers the
feasibility of capture in relation to the imminent violence element.
For instance, if a person is going to be very difficult to capture, then
there might be a lower bar for the requisite threat of imminent
violence. On the other hand, if a person would be relatively easy to
capture, then there might be an extremely high bar-perhaps an
impossibly high bar-for the threat of imminent violence that would
justify a targeted killing. The reverse is also true. If a target poses a
sufficiently high threat of imminent violence, it might never be
feasible to capture him first. In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, perhaps
his capture was considered to be so risky that the requirement of
imminent violence was decreased. Perhaps this also explains the
targeting of his son.
Capture on U.S. soil is certainly easier than it is in Yemen. So
easy, in fact, that a potential target's presence within the United
States might nearly eliminate any justification for a targeted killing.
The threat of imminent violence, however, is greatly increased as
well. In the scenario in this Comment, the enemy combatants cannot
feasibly be captured since they could remotely detonate explosives at
the first sign of any attempt. Furthermore, their presence in the
United States, instead of increasing the feasibility of capture, has
only increased the threat of imminent violence. Therefore, the
capture-is-not-feasible element of Holder's formulation does not
preclude a targeted killing within the United States.
D. In Accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict

The last requirement for the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen is
that it must be done in accordance with the laws of armed
conflict. 137 In general, the laws of armed conflict require that the

136. McNeal, supra note 109.
137. McNeal, supra note 109.
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military necessity of any use of force be balanced with the princtle
of humanity, or the potential to cause unnecessary suffering. 13 If
the target is a military necessity that will not result in unnecessary
suffering, then the laws of armed conflict also require that the
targeting be restricted in its implementation by (1) adhering to the
principle of distinction, 139 (2) adhering to the principle of
proportionality, 140 and (3) using only lawful weapons for their
intended purpose. 141

1. Distinction
The principle of distinction demands that both parties to a
conflict discriminate between civilians and combatants. 142 In
general, military personnel of the opposing nation in an international
armed conflict are considered combatants. 143 The question is more
complicated, however, when dealing with a non-international armed
conflict with a non-state actor, like the War on Terror against alQaeda.144 Civilians, or persons who are not members of a state's
military, can still be targeted, but only if they are directly
participating in the hostilities or are part of an organized armed
force. 145 Furthermore, members of organized armed forces, like alQaeda, who are not identified by a uniform with recognizable
insignia, may be targeted only if they have a "continuous combat
function." 146

138. ICRC, Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights Law,
No. 293
(April 30, 1993), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng!
resources/documents/misc/57jmrt.htm.
139. ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, Oune
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470-750061.
140. Customary IHL: Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC, available at http://www
.icrc.org!customary- ihl/eng/docs/v 1_cha_chapter4 _rule 14.
141. Customary IHL: Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary
Suffering, ICRC, available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl _rul_rule70.
142. Protocol I, supra note 139.
143. Customary IHL: Rule 3. Definition of Combatants, ICRC, available at http://www.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v 1_rul_rule3.
144. See id.
145. Protocol I, supra note 139, at art. 51.
146. ICRC, interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 991, No. 872 part l, §II (Feh. 26, 2009)
(prepared by Nils Melzer), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/irrc-872-
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Holder's criteria that a proposed target must pose an imminent
threat of violence could be interpreted to mean that a proposed
target is a member of an organized armed group of a non-state party
to an armed conflict that has a continuous combat function. 147
Furthermore, johnson argues that the AUMF is not open-ended, but
is limited only to al-Qaeda and associated forces. 148 He defines
"associated forces" as having two necessary characteristics: "(1) an
organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al
Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners." 149 Generally applied,
these considerations seem to adhere to the principle of distinction.
2. Proportionality

Next, the principle of proportionality demands that parties to an
armed conflict limit their targeting to actions where the loss of
civilian life and damage to property is not excessive in relation to the
concrete military advantage that would be gained. 150 Here, the
commander on the ground making the targeting decision has to
quickly assess whether the collateral damage caused by an attack is
proportionate in relation to the military value of the target. The
higher value the target, the more collateral damage will be
tolerated. 151 There is no hard and fast rule about proportionality,
and any judgment on proportionality must take into account all the
circumstances. 152 In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, six non-targeted
people died during the attack, at least one of whom was also an
American citizen. 153 Since no one has officially raised the issue of
proportionality in this attack, it is impossible to say definitively

reports-documents. pdf.
147. See McNeal, supra note 109.
148. Johnson, supra note 68.
149. Id.
150. See Customary IHL: Rule 70, supra note 140.
151. Seeid.
152. See id.
153. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytirnes.com/top/reference/times
topics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated July 18, 2012);
Dominic Rushe et a!., Anwar al-Awlaki Death: US Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen Fallout,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-alawlaki-yemen?newsfeed=true.
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whether it violated the principle of proportionality or not. However,
based on other drone attacks, this does not appear to be an excessive
amount of casualties by U.S. military standards. 154 Therefore, it is
possible that targeting a U.S. citizen with an armed drone attack may
be done according to the law of proportionality.

3. Lawful weapon
Finally, it is necessary to consider if armed drones are lawful
weapons. Armed drones seem to have become the weapons of choice
in the War on Terror. 155 It is also important to note that while the
scenario of armed drones in the United States may seem a long way
off, the use of unarmed drones in the U.S. is rapidly increasing. The
U.S. has already designated domestic drone bases, and the Federal
Aviation Agency is working with testing standards and waivers for
unarmed drones operating within the U.S. 156
Despite the fact that there is no specific treaty outlawing the use
of armed drones, 157 some have questioned their lawfulness and
effectiveness. 158 Critics have highlighted state sovereignty issues as
well as insufficient self-defense justifications for the U.S. drone
operations overseas. 159 These legitimate criticisms, however, do not
apply when considering the use of armed drones within U.S.
territory and do not make the weapon itself unlawful. Harold Koh
and jeh johnson have both argued that the relative advanced nature
of any given weapons system is irrelevant as long as the decision to
target the individual is lawful. 160 Some have even noted that,
strangely, armed drones seem less controversial than older methods
of targeted killing. For example, a former CIA lawyer, Vicki Divoll,
told the New Yorker, "People are a lot more comfortable with a
154. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
155. John Yoo, Dead Terrorists Answer No Questions, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2011,
2:25
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/265648/dead -terrorists-answer -noquestions-john-yoo.
156. Kashmir Hill, Ten Fun Facts About Drones, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 12:25 PM),
http://www. forbes.com/ si tes/kashmirhill/20 12/02/09/1 0-fun-facts-about -drones/2/.
157. See Customary IHL: Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary
Suffering,
[NT'L
COMM.
OF
THE
RED
CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v2 _rul_rule70.
158. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 10, at 125-26.
159. Id. at 115-19.
160. Anderson, supra note 12; Johnson, supra note 68.
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[drone] strike that kills many people than with a throat-slitting that
kills one.'d 61 Beyond being an advanced weapons system, however,
armed drones raise legitimate questions of proportionality.
By 2009, the Brookings Institute determined that American use
of armed drones had resulted in about 600 civilian deaths
worldwide-a ratio of about ten civilian deaths for every lawfully
targeted person. 162 A more recent study focusing only on Pakistan
found that U.S. drone strikes over a three-year period killed fourteen
al-Qaeda leaders and 687 Pakistani civilians. 163 American analysts
may argue that a ten-to-one ratio or even a fifty-to-one ratio is
acceptable according to the principle of proportionality if the
concrete military advantage is important enough. It is hard to
imagine, however, that the same amount of civilian casualties would
be acceptable within the United States. Is it acceptable to have one
standard for proportionality overseas and a different standard for
proportionality at home? Whatever the answer, it does not make the
armed drone an unlawful weapon according to the laws of armed
conflict, although it may provide some practical limitations on how
armed drones are used.
Considering distinction, proportionality, and the use of a lawful
weapon, targeting a U.S. citizen within the United States could be
done according to the laws of armed conflict. When the U.S. military
targets a person, the commander on the ground goes through a
standard methodology to ensure that the targeting complies with the
laws of armed conflict principles discussed here. 164 Figure 1, below,
is an example of what the targeting analysis for a U.S. citizen might
look like. "DPH" indicates a civilian who is directly participating in
the hostilities and "CCF" indicates a civilian who is part of an
organized armed group and has a continuous combat function.

161. jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.
newyorker .com/reporting/2009 /10/26/091 026fa_fact_mayer#ixzz 1o Vo07Kk 4.
162. DanielL. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Quly 14, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0714_targeted_killings_ byman.aspx.
163. Shah, supra note 10, at 126.
164. See U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, p. 1-4 (Nov. 26, 2010).
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V. CONCLUSION

Applying this analysis to the scenario of this Comment, it
appears that it would be legal to target a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil
under a narrow set of circumstances. The President, with proper
congressional authorization, can use military force according to the
laws of armed conflict to target U.S. citizens who are actively
engaged in hostilities against the United States, even if that use of
military force occurs within the territory of the United States.
Targeting a U.S. citizen, however, requires the President to balance
national security concerns with an individual's right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment. 165 Taking all this into account and
using an analysis similar to that demonstrated in Figure 1, the
scenario in this Comment is probably lawful.
The first consideration is whether the potential targeted persons
in the scenario are combatants or civilians. In this scenario, the
targets are not members of a state's armed forces, so they are not
combatants. 166 However, they are not simply civilians, either. No
matter how narrowly one defines the terms, the targets are either
directly participating in the hostilities or are members of an
organized armed force with a continuous combat function because
they are in the middle of a plot to attack the United States by
remotely detonating chemical weapons around San Antonio. 167
Next, there must a be a thorough review that takes into account
all the evidence against the targets and balances the threat they pose
against the possibility of error caused by reduced process. 168 In this
scenario, the President has done such a review. The review must
further find that the targets pose an imminent threat of violence and
that their capture is not feasible. 169 In the scenario, the targets
undoubtedly pose an imminent threat of violence. Furthermore, it
would be completely infeasible to capture them without running the
165. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-34 (2004).
166. See Customary IHL: Rule 3. Definition of Combatants, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(2012), http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v 1_rul_ rule3.
167. See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law Part 1.11 (Feb. 26, 2009) (prepared by Nils Melzer),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf.
168. McNPal, supra note 109; cf- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
169. See McNeal, supra note 109.
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risk that they will have enough time to remotely detonate the
chemical weapons.
An armed drone, the weapon proposed for the targeting of U.S.
citizens in the scenario, is a lawful weapon, but one that tends to
result in non-targeted civilian casualties. 170 Since there is a definite
risk to civilians, it is necessary to consider if all feasible measures
have been taken to reduce collateral damage. 171 In this scenario, it is
difficult to imagine what kind of steps the U.S. military could take to
mitigate the civilian casualties. Any attempt to evacuate the
neighbors or cordon off the area where the targets live would give
them enough warning to detonate their weapons. A conservative
approach to the armed drone attack might result in a survivor who
could then detonate the chemical weapons.
Once the commander of the operation determines that he has
taken all feasible measures for the attack, he must still consider the
proportionality of the attack. In the scenario, the armed drone attack
kills two targets and seventeen non-targeted civilians. Based on the
seriousness of the threat of chemical weapons detonated in a highly
populated area, the amount of civilian casualties in this scenario is
probably proportional. If it is not, then it raises serious questions
about the lawfulness of U.S. armed drone attacks overseas. Nothing
in the laws of armed conflict indicates that proportionality should be
calculated differently based on the civilians' nationalities. 172
Based on this analysis, it would be legal for the U.S. military to
use an armed drone to target and kill a U.S. citizen within the United
States based on the laws of armed conflict and the authority granted
under the AUMF. This conclusion runs contrary to the century-old
American tradition of extraterritorial armed conflict, but it is in
harmony with U.S. domestic law and international law. This also
explains much of the controversy surrounding the 2012 NDAA. The
NDAA hinted that war is something that could happen in the U.S.
even though that directly conflicts with the popular American idea
that war is something that happens overseas and to other people.
170. See Byman, supra note 162.
171. Customary IHL: Rule 22. Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks, ICRC (2012),
available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_rul_rule22.
172. See Customary IHL: Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC (20 12), available at
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v I_ cha_chapter4 _rule 14.
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The conclusion that under certain circumstances the U.S. could use
armed drones to kill U.S. citizens within the United States is a
statement of lex lata, or the law as it currently stands. It is
emphatically not an opinion about what the law should be. While
the conclusion of this Comment is admittedly disturbing, hopefully
it will be a starting point for a renewed discussion about the
inherent value of human life and the responsibility of a state to
provide security for its citizens.

Marshall Thompson

*

* ]D candidate, April 2013, j. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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